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Abstract 
 Streptococcus pneumoniae is increasingly recognised as an important cause 
of bacterial meningitis in the African meningitis belt. The World Health Organization 
sets guidelines for response to outbreaks of meningococcal meningitis, but there are 
no current guidelines for outbreaks where S. pneumoniae is implicated. We aimed to 
evaluate the impact of using a similar response to target outbreaks of vaccine-
preventable pneumococcal meningitis in the meningitis belt. Here, we adapt a previous 
model of reactive vaccination for meningococcal outbreaks to estimate the potential 
impact of reactive vaccination in a recent pneumococcal meningitis outbreak in the 
Brong-Ahafo region of central Ghana using weekly line list data on all suspected 
cases over a period of five months. We determine the sensitivity and specificity of 
various epidemic thresholds and model the cases and deaths averted by reactive 
vaccination. An epidemic threshold of 10 suspected cases per 100,000 population 
per week performed the best, predicting large outbreaks with 100% sensitivity and 
more than 85% specificity. In this outbreak, reactive vaccination would have 
prevented a lower number of cases per individual vaccinated (approximately 15,300 
doses per case averted) than previously estimated for meningococcal outbreaks. 
Since the burden of death and disability from pneumococcal meningitis is higher 
than that from meningococcal meningitis, there may still be merit in considering 
reactive vaccination for outbreaks of pneumococcal meningitis. More outbreak data 
are needed to refine our model estimates. Whatever policy is followed, we 
emphasize the importance of timely laboratory confirmation of suspected cases to 
enable appropriate decisions about outbreak response. 
*Abstract
Introduction 47 
Following the rollout of the serogroup A conjugate vaccine, MenAfriVac, across the 48 
African meningitis belt since 2010, the incidence of meningococcal meningitis due to 49 
serogroup A has sharply declined.(1) With an accompanying increase in surveillance quality, 50 
it has become increasingly clear that meningitis due to Streptococcus pneumoniae (Spn) 51 
represents a substantial proportion of the burden of endemic meningitis in this region. In 52 
addition to this, localized outbreaks of pneumococcal disease, in excess of normal seasonal 53 
activity, have been reported.(2–7)  54 
The introduction of a 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV13) into 55 
Ghana’s routine immunization programme as a 3 + 0 schedule in 2013 is expected to have 56 
decreased the burden of invasive pneumococcal disease in children aged under five years, 57 
based on observations from other African countries.(8) It has been shown in high-income 58 
countries that PCVs provide indirect protection against invasive pneumococcal disease to 59 
older children and adults and that this is accelerated with the use of catch-up campaigns, 60 
however the only country to show indirect benefit without a catch up campaign in older 61 
children used a 2 + 1 schedule.(9,10) The scale of indirect effects that might be achieved 62 
following routine infant PCV immunisation in African countries is not yet clear. An outbreak 63 
of predominantly serotype 1 pneumococcal meningitis in the Brong-Ahafo region of Ghana 64 
in late 2015 and early 2016 demonstrated the ongoing vulnerability of older age groups and 65 
the continuing potential of Spn to cause meningitis outbreaks in spite of high PCV coverage 66 
in infants (94%).(2,11) 67 
 Outbreaks of meningococcal meningitis in the African meningitis belt trigger a 68 
reactive vaccination response, with the public health goal of curtailing the outbreak and 69 
thus preventing cases and deaths. It has been suggested that outbreaks of pneumococcal 70 
*Manuscript
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meningitis due to a vaccine-preventable serotype could also merit such a response.(7,12) To 71 
quantify the potential benefits of reactive vaccination for pneumococcal meningitis 72 
outbreaks we modelled a reactive vaccination response to the Brong-Ahafo pneumococcal 73 
meningitis outbreak. Under the current WHO guidelines applied to outbreaks of 74 
meningococcal meningitis, when districts exceed a threshold of 10 suspected cases per 75 
100,000 population in a week, an epidemic response is triggered.(13) Countries may submit 76 
a request to the International Coordinating Group on Vaccine Provision for Epidemic 77 
Meningitis Control for supplies of meningococcal vaccines to deploy in affected districts. 78 
However, this process takes some time as a request must be completed and reviewed and 79 
vaccine stocks must be delivered, often to inaccessible areas. For this model, we considered 80 
the potential impact of mass vaccination response in affected districts with PCV13, to see 81 
whether similar guidelines may be appropriate for outbreaks of pneumococcal meningitis.  82 
When discussing disease in the African meningitis belt, it is important to distinguish 83 
between seasonal fluctuations in endemic disease, outbreaks - which may be defined as an 84 
isolated district surpassing the epidemic weekly incidence threshold, and widespread 85 
epidemics, which affect whole regions or countries in a season. For the purposes of this 86 
study, we define an outbreak of pneumococcal meningitis using two criteria: i) weekly 87 
incidence on the regional or district level of suspected meningitis over a single dry season 88 
exceeding some epidemic threshold that reflects the upper bound of dry season endemic 89 
incidence, ii) where pneumococcus is the predominant cause. We retain the term “epidemic 90 
threshold” for consistency with meningococcal vaccination policy, but do not mean to imply 91 
that these events constitute widespread epidemics.  92 
 93 
Methods 94 
Line list data on all suspected cases of meningitis reported in the Brong-Ahafo 95 
Region between 2 December 2015 (week 49, 2015) and 11 April 2016 (week 15, 2016) were 96 
obtained from the Ghana Health Service. Brong-Ahafo is a predominantly rural region 97 
located in central Ghana, an area previously considered to be just outside the main 98 
meningitis belt. A suspected case of meningitis was defined as any person with sudden 99 
onset of fever and one of the following signs: neck stiffness, flaccid neck (in infants), bulging 100 
fontanelle (infants) convulsion, or other meningeal signs.(14) We determined the sensitivity 101 
and specificity of a variety of incidence thresholds (10, 7, 5, and 3 suspected cases per 102 
100,000 per week) for predicting a range of sizes of outbreaks (20, 40, 60, 80, and 100 103 
cumulative cases per 100,000). We then modelled reactive vaccination of 5- to 29-year-olds 104 
building on methods developed in an earlier paper, using an epidemic threshold of 10 105 
suspected cases per 100,000 per week to define the beginning of the outbreak and an 106 
endemic threshold of 2 suspected cases per 100,000 per week to define the end of the 107 
outbreak.(15) We also performed a sensitivity analysis using a lower epidemic threshold of 3 108 
suspected cases per 100,000 per week, which corresponds to the alert threshold for 109 
meningococcal meningitis. We chose to target 5- to 29-year-olds because this would 110 
effectively extend coverage to all individuals under 30 years of age (we assumed children 111 
under the age of 5 years were protected by the routine infant PCV13 vaccine schedule) and 112 
because the highest incidence of confirmed pneumococcal meningitis was observed in the 113 
10 to 14- and 15to 29-year age groups.  114 
 As a variety of laboratory tests were used for case confirmation, aetiology was 115 
classified according to Table 1. In a large proportion of cases (60%), aetiology could not be 116 
definitively determined. For this reason, we modelled true cases of Spn meningitis weekly 117 
for each district as  118 
CSpn = Cs,i (1 – pn) pSpn 119 
where Cs,i is the number of suspected cases reported in week i, pn is the proportion of CSF 120 
samples in the district testing negative (in Table 1, both probable and confirmed negative 121 
cases), and pSpn is the proportion of all confirmed cases in the district due to Spn. This 122 
modelled case count is hereafter referred to as likely Spn cases. Because there was some 123 
uncertainty regarding false negative tests, we performed a sensitivity analysis where pn is 124 
only the proportion of CSF samples in the district testing negative by two or more tests (in 125 
Table 1, confirmed negative cases). 126 
 We then simulated vaccination with PCV13 using the same methods described in 127 
Trotter et al 2015, making the following assumptions: 128 
· 5- to 29-year-olds represent 52% of the population (16)  129 
· Case fatality ratio for pneumococcal meningitis cases is 23%, as reported for 130 
confirmed pneumococcal meningitis cases in this data set  131 
· 79% of cases of pneumococcal meningitis were caused by PCV13 vaccine-type 132 
serotypes (2)  133 
· A single dose of PCV13 would protect at 90% of individuals 5 to 29 years of age 134 
against PCV13 vaccine-type serotypes, giving two weeks for the protection to take 135 
effect (17) 136 
· 5% vaccine wastage 137 
One district, Sene West, was excluded from the analysis despite having crossed the 138 
epidemic threshold because the majority of confirmed cases were due to Nm. 139 
 We determined the cases prevented, deaths prevented, number needed to 140 
vaccinate to prevent a case (NNV) and number needed to vaccinate to prevent a death 141 
(NNVD) for three scenarios: where vaccination occurs immediately, two, and four weeks 142 
after crossing the epidemic threshold (lag of zero, two or four weeks, respectively). 143 
 144 
Results 145 
Twenty of the 27 districts of the Brong-Ahafo Region were represented in the line 146 
list. The districts had a mean population size of 105,000. Over the 19-week study period, 147 
nine of these had cumulative suspected meningitis incidence greater than 20 suspected 148 
cases per 100,000; five had cumulative incidence greater than 40 per 100,000; four had 149 
cumulative incidence greater than 80 per 100,000, and three had cumulative incidence 150 
greater than 100 per 100,000. For predicting larger outbreaks of 60 suspected cases per 151 
100,000 and greater, all thresholds had a sensitivity and negative predictive value of 100%, 152 
but a threshold of 10 per 100,000 per week had the best positive predictive values and 153 
specificity (Figure 1). 154 
Five districts (Jaman North, Nkoranza South, Tain, Techiman North, and Wenchi) 155 
crossed the epidemic threshold of 10 cases per 100,000 per week, three of which exceeded 156 
a cumulative incidence of 100 cases per 100,000 (Figure 2). 157 
Sixty six percent of suspected bacterial meningitis cases in the five outbreak districts 158 
and 73% of confirmed pneumococcal meningitis cases occurred in 5- to 29-year-olds. Figure 159 
3 shows the age distribution of suspected and confirmed incidence of meningitis in the five 160 
districts triggering the epidemic threshold. 161 
Vaccinating individuals between 5 and 29 years of age in the five eligible districts 162 
would have required approximately 284,000 doses of vaccine (Table 3). If a vaccination 163 
campaign had been implemented within two weeks of triggering the epidemic threshold of 164 
10 suspected cases per 100,000 per week, an estimated number of 36 cases would have 165 
been prevented during the outbreak period, placing the number needed to vaccinate to 166 
prevent a case at 15,300. With a delay of four weeks, 20 cases might have been prevented, 167 
whereas immediate vaccination might have averted 61 cases.  168 
 Using a lower threshold of 3 cases per 100,000 per week prevents only a few more 169 
cases, but raises the number needed the vaccinate to prevent a case significantly because 170 
districts with much smaller outbreaks also trigger a response. 171 
 Using a stricter definition for bacteria negative CSFs results in a much higher 172 
estimate of the number of likely Spn meningitis cases (335 cases as opposed to 176 in the 173 
five outbreak districts) and a lower number needed to vaccinate to prevent a case (Table 174 
S1). With a delay of two weeks, 63 cases might have been prevented, placing the number 175 
needed to vaccinate at 8,800, whereas immediate vaccination might have averted 113 176 
cases, placing the number needed to vaccinate at 4,800. 177 
 178 
Discussion 179 
An incidence threshold of 10 cases per 100,000 seems the most appropriate 180 
epidemic threshold for pneumococcal meningitis outbreaks given the limited data available. 181 
This threshold would also have been triggered in four of five previous likely outbreaks of 182 
pneumococcal meningitis identified in the WHO enhanced meningitis surveillance system 183 
(Solenzo, Burkina Faso, 2009; Goundi, Chad, 2009; Karangasso Vigue, Burkina Faso, 2011; 184 
Pama, Burkina Faso, 2011).(1) No attempt was made to evaluate different microbiological 185 
criteria for defining a pneumococcal outbreak. In this case, a simple majority of confirmed 186 
cases due to Spn was required. 187 
Excluding the sensitivity analysis, the number needed to vaccinate to prevent a case 188 
(NNV) is higher than the range of previous estimates for reactive meningococcal campaigns 189 
(3,700 to 11,600 for 2 to 4 week lag),(15) suggesting that reactive vaccination for 190 
pneumococcal meningitis outbreaks may be less efficient in preventing cases. Whilst the 191 
number needed to vaccinate to prevent a death (NNVD) has not been estimated for reactive 192 
meningococcal campaigns, the NNVD is expected to be lower for reactive vaccination in 193 
pneumococcal outbreaks given the higher case-fatality rates typically associated with 194 
pneumococcal meningitis.(18) 195 
It is not certain how quickly immune response would build up after PCV13 in the 196 
targeted age groups, however, a clinical trial of naïve 10- to 18-year-olds showed high 197 
(>90%) responsiveness one month post-vaccination.(17) A conjugate vaccine like PCV13 198 
would also have additional indirect benefits, decreasing carriage and transmission of 199 
vaccine-type serotypes where it is used, although realizing the full indirect benefits would 200 
take several months.  201 
Serotype 1 was particularly dominant in this outbreak. Seven other studies in the 202 
meningitis belt have reported serotype distribution of pneumococcal meningitis cases, all in 203 
populations with no PCV use.(3,6,18,20–23) Overall, 45% were serotype 1. Kwambana-204 
Adams 2016 reports a higher proportion of isolates belonging to serotype 1 (67% overall) in 205 
the Brong Ahafo outbreak than in the other studies.(2) Among the other studies, there are 206 
no marked differences between settings described as “epidemic” or “outbreak” and 207 
endemic settings. There are no appropriate data available to support or contradict the 208 
hypothesis that outbreaks or clusters of disease tend to be caused by a single serotype 209 
because most serotyping data is published as aggregate data over many years.  210 
This model is more conservative than the model used to evaluate reactive 211 
meningococcal vaccination.(15) Whereas the meningococcal model assumed all cases 212 
occurred in individuals under 30 years of age, this model estimates that only 70% of cases 213 
occur in the targeted age group. The meningococcal model also assumed that 79% of 214 
suspected cases were due to NmW. In addition, the surveillance system relies on a case 215 
definition of meningitis; immunisation against Spn may prevent additional cases of 216 
pneumonia and septicaemia making these estimates conservative.  217 
However, the predictions of this model are highly dependent on the age distribution 218 
of cases, the proportion of cases due to Spn, and the overall shape of the incidence curve 219 
over time. The data from the Brong-Ahafo outbreak show a particularly strong peak in the 220 
15- to 29-year age group, similar to distributions reported from endemic situations.(18) By 221 
contrast, the distribution of incidence of Spn meningitis from Traore 2009 peaks sharply in 222 
infants but is otherwise fairly even across age groups despite a description in the discussion 223 
of “epidemic” patterns.(3)  224 
Because many cases had no associated laboratory data, we have chosen to model 225 
suspected Spn meningitis cases. As our sensitivity analysis has shown (Table S1), reactive 226 
vaccination may be more or less effective depending on underlying assumptions about the 227 
true proportion of suspected meningitis cases caused by S. pneumoniae. The case-fatality 228 
rates in each category support our classification system, with low rates in bacteria-negative 229 
cases, intermediate rates in untested cases, and high rates in Spn- and Nm-confirmed cases 230 
(Table 1). 231 
These predictions are also dependent on how quickly the outbreak progresses. In 232 
this outbreak, 14% of suspected cases occurred within four weeks of triggering the epidemic 233 
threshold – in other words, 14% of suspected cases would be missed by a reactive response 234 
with a lag of two weeks. More suspected cases occurred in the first four weeks of past 235 
suspected pneumococcal meningitis outbreaks: 18% in Goundi, Chad in 2009, 28% in 236 
Karangasso Vigue, Burkina Faso in 2011, 21% in Pama, Burkina Faso in 2011 and 38% in 237 
Solenzo, Burkina Faso in 2009.(1)  238 
Our estimates, based on data from the Brong-Ahafo outbreak, suggest that reactive 239 
vaccination for pneumococcal meningitis would have prevented fewer cases per dose of 240 
vaccine than previous estimates for meningococcal meningitis reactive vaccination (a 241 
routine intervention in the African meningitis belt). As the size and duration of outbreaks 242 
are likely to vary by country and by year, data from future outbreaks are needed to refine 243 
these estimates.  244 
It is clear that any reactive response must be timely in order for it to be effective. A 245 
particular challenge is ensuring rapid microbiological confirmation of the organism 246 
responsible for the outbreak and serotyping of pneumococcal isolates to determine if the 247 
outbreak is due to a vaccine-type strain. In Brong-Ahafo, serotyping facilities were initially 248 
not available locally and samples were sent to the MRC laboratory in The Gambia, leading to 249 
an interval of several weeks before results were available. A technical mission from MRC the 250 
Gambia provided support to establish serotyping capacity in Sunyani hospital in Brong-251 
Ahafo during the course of the outbreak. In addition, CDC established PCR capability at 252 
Tamali Zonal Public Health Laboratory during the outbreak, which serves Brong-Ahafo. If 253 
reactive vaccination for pneumococcal meningitis outbreaks were to be recommended by 254 
WHO, it will be important to ensure that other meningitis belt regions also establish and 255 
maintain serotyping capacity. Even if reactive vaccination for pneumococcal meningitis 256 
outbreaks is not recommended, building laboratory capacity in these regions will benefit 257 
health systems more broadly. 258 
This study does not evaluate the potential impact of mass preventive vaccination, or 259 
of extending PCV coverage to older age groups through catch-up campaigns. WHO’s 260 
Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) on Immunization reviewed primary data on PCV 261 
vaccine schedules and their impact on carriage and disease, together with evidence from 262 
modelling studies on the impact of catch-up campaigns in October 2017 263 
(http://www.who.int/immunization/policy/sage/en/). Further work may be warranted to 264 
quantify the impact of extending PCV to older ages (over 5 years) in preventive campaigns, 265 
but this is beyond the scope of this paper. 266 
With the roll-out of PCV in the African meningitis belt, the risk of pneumococcal 267 
meningitis outbreaks and the need for subsequent reactive vaccination responses may 268 
recede as increasing numbers of birth cohorts are protected. The WHO is currently 269 
reviewing whether a different vaccination schedule with a subsequent booster dose would 270 
be more appropriate for this setting.(12) Meanwhile, this study provides the first evidence 271 
that pneumococcal reactive vaccination could prevent cases and save lives during confirmed 272 
outbreaks. Additional work is needed to clarify the conditions warranting a response, and 273 
the logistical implications of supplying PCV13 for reactive vaccine campaigns.   274 
Table 1. Classification of case etiology; frequency and case fatality rates by etiology. 275 
Classification Criteria Number 
of cases 
Case fatality 
rate 
Spn Any test (Pastorex, culture or PCR) indicating 
Spn or positive gram stain 
168 23% 
Nm Any test (Pastorex, culture or PCR) indicating 
Nm or negative gram stain 
40 23% 
Indeterminate Any sample with no test results 209 15% 
Probable 
negative 
One test (Pastorex, culture, PCR or gram stain) 
failing to indicate bacteria in CSF 
366 2% 
Confirmed 
negative 
Two or more tests (Pastorex, culture, PCR or 
gram stain) failing to indicate bacteria in CSF  
183 0% 
 276 
Table 2. Summary of line list data for the 19-week study period by district. 277 
District Population Suspected 
meningitis 
cases 
Confirmed 
Spn 
meningitis 
cases 
Confirmed 
Nm 
meningitis 
cases 
Epidemic 
threshold 
(suspected 
weekly cases 
10 per 10
5
) 
exceeded 
Cumulative 
incidence 
per 10
5 
Asunafo North 143000 14 7 1 No 9.8 
Asutifi North 60800 1 0 0 No 1.6 
Asutifi South 60600 4 2 1 No 6.6 
Atebubu-
Amanten 
121000 12 3 0 No 9.9 
Berekum 149000 2 2 0 No 1.3 
Dormaa East 58300 6 1 0 No 10.3 
Dormaa 
Municipal 
129000 27 7 1 No 21.0 
Jaman South 106000 7 5 7 No 6.6 
Kintampo North 109000 11 3 1 No 10.1 
Pru 148000 9 3 2 No 6.1 
Sene East 69400 5 1 0 No 7.2 
Sunyani 
Municipal 
141000 28 9 0 No 19.8 
Tano South 89600 4 2 0 No 4.5 
Techiman 
Municipal 
169000 77 10 4 No 45.5 
Jaman North 95200 364 39 2 Yes 382.3 
Nkoranza South 116000 100 24 6 Yes 86.4 
Sene West 66800 20 2 0 Yes 29.9 
Tain 101000 145 19 12 Yes 143.6 
Techiman North 67700 20 1 1 Yes 29.5 
Wenchi 103000 110 28 2 Yes 106.9 
 278 
Table 3. Cases and deaths prevented by reactive vaccination with different lag time (weeks 279 
between crossing of incidence threshold and implementation of reactive vaccination 280 
campaign). 281 
Incidence 
threshold 
Lag in 
weeks 
Cases prevented (% of 
total likely Spn [CSpn] 
cases during outbreak) 
Deaths 
prevented 
Number needed 
to vaccinate to 
prevent a case 
Number needed 
to vaccinate to 
prevent a death 
10 0 61 35% 14 9100 39100 
10 2 36 21% 8 15300 66000 
10 4 20 11% 5 27800 120000 
3 0 63 32% 15 22500 96900 
3 2 40 20% 9 35300 152000 
3 4 23 12% 6 60500 261000 
 282 
Figure 1. Negative predictive value (NPV), positive predictive value (PPV), sensitivity, and 283 
specificity of various incidence thresholds (3, 5, 7, and 10 suspected cases per 100,000 per 284 
week) for predicting a range of sizes of outbreaks. 285 
 286 
Figure 2. Incidence of suspected meningitis, likely and confirmed pneumococcal meningitis 287 
in five districts crossing the epidemic threshold of 10 cases per 100,000. Grey vertical lines 288 
indicate beginning and end of outbreak period. 289 
 290 
Figure 3. Age distribution of suspected meningitis and confirmed pneumococcal meningitis 291 
incidence in five districts crossing the epidemic threshold of 10 cases per 100,000. 292 
 293 
 294 
Supplementary Information 295 
Table S1. Cases and deaths prevented by reactive vaccination with different times to 296 
implementation using strict negative case definition. 297 
Incidence 
threshold 
Lag in 
weeks 
Cases prevented (% of 
total likely Spn [CSpn] 
cases during outbreak) 
Deaths 
prevented 
Number needed 
to vaccinate to 
prevent a case 
Number needed 
to vaccinate to 
prevent a death 
10 0 113 35% 26 4800 20900 
10 2 63 19% 15 8800 37800 
10 4 30 9% 7 18300 78700 
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